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Abstract—We report on our research on proving the security
of multi-party cryptographic protocols using the EASYCRYPT
proof assistant. We work in the computational model us-
ing the sequence of games approach, and define honest-but-
curious (semi-honest) security using a variation of the real/ideal
paradigm in which, for each protocol party, an adversary
chooses protocol inputs in an attempt to distinguish the party’s
real and ideal games. Our proofs are information-theoretic,
instead of being based on complexity theory and computational
assumptions. We employ oracles (e.g., random oracles for hash-
ing) whose encapsulated states depend on dynamically-made,
nonprogrammable random choices. By limiting an adversary’s
oracle use, one may obtain concrete upper bounds on the
distances between a party’s real and ideal games that are
expressed in terms of game parameters. Furthermore, our
proofs work for adaptive adversaries, ones that, when choosing
the value of a protocol input, may condition this choice on their
current protocol view and oracle knowledge. We provide an
analysis in EASYCRYPT of a three party private count retrieval
protocol. We emphasize the lessons learned from completing
this proof.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we report on our research at mechanizing
the security proofs of multi-party cryptographic protocols in
the computational model. We limit ourselves to honest-but-
curious (semi-honest) security: each party of the protocol
follows the rules of the protocol, but may try to learn as
much as it can from the information coming its way—i.e.,
from its protocol view. We define security using a variation
of the simulation-based real/ideal paradigm [1], [2] in which,
for each protocol party, an adversary chooses protocol inputs
in an attempt to distinguish the party’s real and ideal games.
Intuitively, the adversary is trying to learn more from a
party’s view in the real game than it should be able to—
i.e., more than it can learn from the view produced by the
ideal game. If it cannot do this, we say that the protocol is
secure against the protocol party. More formally, the real
and ideal games for a protocol party return the boolean
judgments made by the adversary, and a security theorem
upper-bounds the absolute value of the difference between
the probabilities that the real and ideal games return true.
There are several ways to bound the distance between the
real and ideal games. One may work with upper bounds
that explicitly involve the concrete adversaries constructed
during a sequence of games proof [3]–[5]. For instance,
part of the upper bound might be the advantage of a
concrete adversary A in differentiating between the games
defining security of a pseudorandom function F (the first
game involves use of the application of F to a randomly
generated key unknown to A, whereas the second game
involves use of a uniformly random function). Another
approach is to make use of complexity theoretic assumptions
about the adversaries attempting to distinguish the real and
ideal games, assuming, e.g., that they run in probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT), in terms of a security parameter
λ. One must then prove that constructed adversaries (like
A, above) are also in the same complexity classes. E.g.,
this allows us to define and use in security theorems’ upper
bounds the advantage of a PPT adversary in differentiating
between the pseudorandom function games—i.e., the least
upper bound, across all PPT adversaries A, of the advantage
of A in differentiating between the games. Finally, one may
work with oracles (e.g., random oracles for hashing [6])
whose encapsulated states depend on dynamically-made,
random choices, and to limit an adversary’s oracle use.
This information-theoretic approach allows one to upper-
bound the distance between real and ideal games using
bounds involving game parameters, like sizes of hash tags or
limits on adversary oracle use. Combinations of the above
approaches are also possible; e.g., one may both work with
PPT adversaries and limit their usage of oracles.
An adversary’s generation of protocol inputs may be done
adaptively or non-adaptively. In the non-adaptive case, all
the inputs are generated up front, before the protocol’s exe-
cution begins, whereas in the adaptive case, when choosing
the value of a protocol input, the adversary may condition
this choice on its current protocol view and oracle knowl-
edge. Non-adaptive protocols are both easier to define and
prove secure, but adaptive protocols provide a more realistic
abstraction of the behavior of adversaries in practice.
A. Our Contributions
In our work, we are developing and employing techniques
for proving the adaptive, information-theoretic, honest-but-
curious security of cryptographic protocols in the nonpro-
grammable random oracle model [6]. We formalize our
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proofs using EASYCRYPT [7], [8], a framework for interac-
tively finding security proofs for cryptographic constructions
and protocols using the sequence of games approach [3]–
[5]. In EASYCRYPT’s logics, one may specify that an
adversary is “lossless,” i.e., always terminating, but there is
no more precise way of bounding its execution time, either
asymptotically or concretely. On the other hand, limiting an
adversary’s oracle access is straightforward in EASYCRYPT,
making it fruitful to work information-theoretically.
In this paper, we present as a case study the security proof
of a simple secure database protocol that we call PCR, for
“Private Count Retrieval” (see Section III). This protocol
raises many of the issues that will arise in more complex
protected database search protocols [9], including:
• working with multiple protocol parties, each with their
own security guarantees;
• expressing a protocol in such a way that it can be
specialized to the real games for the different protocol
parties;
• expressing ideal games parameterized by simulators,
whose job is to construct parties’ views given the
limited information provided by the ideal games;
• coping with adaptive adversaries;
• working with oracles having encapsulated random state,
and constraining oracle use by adversaries;
• calculating concrete upper bounds on the distance be-
tween pairs of cryptographic games;
• carrying out cryptographic reductions;
• reasoning up to failure (up to bad reasoning);
• working with complex relational invariants; and
• removing redundant hashing.
B. Paper Outline
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
begin by surveying the relevant literature (Section II). Next
we define the PCR Protocol (Section III), say what it means
for PCR to be secure (Section IV), and state the theorems
expressing security against the protocol parties (Section V).
This is followed by a brief survey of EASYCRYPT (Sec-
tion VI). Section VII describes the EASYCRYPT formal-
ization of the PCR Protocol, along with the definitions on
which it is based. Sections VIII–X consider the EASYCRYPT
formalizations of the proofs of security against the Client,
Server and Third Party. In Section XI, we summarize the
results of our PCR case study, taking stock of what was
learned. And in Section XII, we look forward to the next
steps of our research program.
II. RELATED WORK
Numerous cryptographic constructions and protocols have
been proved secure using EASYCRYPT, including OAEP
[10], Merkle-Damgård [11], a core part of the TLS Hand-
shake Protocol [12], RSA-PSS [13], one-round key exchange
protocols [14] and padding-based encryption [15]. In con-
trast to these protocols, our PCR protocol involves three
parties and multiple rounds of interaction.
CRYPTOVERIF [16] is another tool for finding sequence
of games proofs in the computational model. This highly
automated tool attempts to synthesize intermediate games.
CRYPTOVERIF has been successfully applied to an aspect
of SSH’s Transport Layer Protocol [17], as well as to the
Kerberos network authentication system [18]. But CRYP-
TOVERIF’s automated nature is a two-edged sword: it makes
some proofs very easy, but complex proofs of multi-party
cryptographic protocols are outside its scope.
Cryptographic algorithms and protocols may also be
proved secure in the computation model using Petcher and
Morrisett’s Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF)
[19], which is shallowly embedded in the Coq proof assistant
[20]. Petcher and Morrisett reported in [21] on using FCF to
prove the security of a two-party protected database search
protocol from [22]. In this protocol, databases are finite maps
sending document indices (integers) to sets of keywords. A
query q is a keyword, and is a request for the set of indices i
such that q is an element of i’s keyword set. In the protocol,
the Client holds a database, but sends it to the Server in
encrypted form (as what is called a TSet). When the Client
wants the answer to a database query, it sends an encrypted
form of the query (an stag) to the Server, which is able to
return to the Client the query’s answer, also in encrypted
form. The goal of the protocol is for the Server to learn
almost nothing about the database and queries through its
interaction with the Client.
Petcher and Morrisett define the security of this protocol
using the real/ideal paradigm, but they only prove security
against the Server, because the Client owns the database and
proposes the queries. They work with a non-adaptive adver-
sary, one that proposes both the database and all queries,
up front. And they employ pseudorandom functions, rather
than working in the random oracle model. The upper bound
of their security theorem involves the concrete adversaries
constructed during their sequence of games proof. They
note that, were they to tackle the adaptive version of their
protocol, they would work in the random oracle model.
There is a large literature on protected database search
protocols with non-mechanized proofs. We refer interested
readers to the following surveys for more information: [9],
[23].
III. PCR PROTOCOL
In this section, we define the PCR protocol. It involves
three parties: a Server, which holds a database, a Client,
which makes queries about the database, and an untrusted
Third Party (TP), which mediates between the Server and
Client. A database is one-dimensional: it consists of a list









Figure 1. PCR Protocol Operation
an element, and is a request for the count of the number of
times it occurs in the database.
We assume the parties do not collude with each other. The
goal is for:
• the Client to learn only the counts for its queries, not
anything else about the database;
• the Server to learn only the number of queries made
by the Client, not which queries are made or what their
counts are; and
• the TP to learn nothing about the database and queries
other than certain element patterns (see below for what
this means).
The Protocol’s operation involves interaction with an
Environment, as illustrated in Figure 1. Because we are
working with honest-but-curious security, we find it more
convenient for control flow to be driven by the Protocol,
instead of by the Environment.
The Server randomly generates a secret, sec, and shares
it with the Client, but not the TP. The Server requests a
database from the Environment. If the request is refused, the
Protocol terminates. Otherwise the Server randomly shuffles
the database db, and turns the result into a hashed database
hdb, which it sends to the TP. Each element, elem , of db is
turned into the hash of (elem , sec). Then the Client enters its
query processing loop. At each iteration, it requests a query,
qry , from the Environment. If the request is refused, the
Protocol terminates. Otherwise the Client hashes (qry , sec),
and asks the TP for the number of occurrences, count , of
this hash tag, tag , in hdb . The Client then supplies count
to the Environment. Before the Protocol terminates, it asks
the Environment what value the Protocol should return, and
then returns this value as its overall result.
Secrets and hash tags are bit strings of length sec len
and tag len, respectively, which are tunable parameters of
the protocol. Hashing is done using a random oracle [6],
consisting of a finite map to which new input/output pairs
are added, dynamically. Element/secret pairs are mapped
to hash tags, which are chosen uniformly randomly. The
oracle’s state is encapsulated: the Protocol (and Adversary
and Simulator—see Section IV)) may only interact with it
via the act of hashing. There is no way to check whether
a given element/secret pair is already in the domain of the
oracle’s map; consequently, it is irrelevant to users of the
oracle whether the pair has already been assigned a hash
tag.
Normally, the set of all elements will be much bigger
than the set of all hash tags; in fact, the former set will
typically be infinite, whereas the latter has size 2tag len. If a
hash collision occurs, the Client’s results may be inflated.
E.g., if the database consists of distinct elements x and y,
but (x, sec) and (y, sec) hash to the same hash tag, then the
count for query x will be 2 not 1. But—assuming tag len
is large enough and the numbers of unique elements in the
database and unique queries processed are small enough—
hash collisions will be very unlikely. Thus, the Client should
learn the correct counts of all the queries it processes.
Because the database is shuffled before being turned
into a hashed database, and since hashing is not efficiently
invertible and the TP will be unlikely to guess sec (assuming
sec len is big enough), the TP should only learn element
patterns, not actual elements, from its interactions with the
Server and Client. In particular, it will not learn anything
about the order of the database (e.g., if the database begins
with two occurrences of an element, the TP will not learn
this fact).
IV. DEFINITION OF SECURITY FOR PCR
We formalize security of the PCR protocol using the
real/ideal paradigm. For each protocol party (Server, Client
and Third Party), we have a pair of cryptographic games: a
“real” game and an “ideal” game. The real games are based
on the protocol as described above, where everything the
party sees is recorded in its “view.” The ideal game for a
given party is designed so as to make it obvious that the
party does not learn anything it should not, but where the
party’s view and random oracle state—as viewed through
the lens of its hashing procedure—may still be simulated
from the available information.
The real game for a given protocol party is parameterized
by an Adversary with access to the random oracle. The
Adversary plays the role of the Environment mentioned
above when explaining the operation of the protocol. When
the Adversary is called, the current value of the party’s
protocol view is passed to it. Upon the Protocol’s final
call to the Adversary, asking it for a final value to return,
the Adversary returns a final boolean judgment, which the
Protocol then returns as its final result. The Adversary is
allowed to maintain state between the calls to it. When the
Client processes a query provided by the Adversary, the
Adversary is not informed of the result of the query, but
is simply told that the query was processed (and what the
party’s view is at this point). Of course the Client’s view
does include the counts for all queries processed.
The ideal game for a protocol party is parameterized
by both the party’s Adversary and a Simulator. The job
of the simulator is to try to make the Adversary think it





Figure 2. Structure of Ideal Games
the party’s view and random oracle state given the limited
information provided by the ideal game. This architecture
is illustrated in Figure 2. We can usefully think of the
Simulator as being inside the ideal game, which acts as an
intermediary between it and the Adversary.
When we talk about what a given party learns about the
database and queries supplied by the Adversary in the real or
ideal game, we are referring to what the Adversary can learn
from the values of the party’s view that are passed back to it,
as well as from its interactions with the random oracle. One
may think of the party as being “woken up” upon each call
of the Adversary. E.g., even after the Server has completed
its construction of the hashed database, at each iteration of
the Client’s query processing loop, the Server is woken up,
reminded of its current view, and allowed to interact with the
random oracle. Consequently, the Server learns the number
of queries that are processed by this loop.
Because we work information-theoretically, when assess-
ing the information leakage of a party’s ideal game, we do
not have to scrutinize the party’s Simulator (e.g., it cannot
learn more about the database or queries by brute force
computation). Consequently, the Simulator will be part of
the proof —rather than the specification—of security.
A. Server’s Ideal Game and Simulator
In the Server’s ideal game, the Simulator must construct
the Server’s view without being given any information by
the ideal game. For the real and ideal games to be indis-
tinguishable, the ideal game must still have a Client loop
in which the Adversary is allowed to propose a sequence of
queries, which are ignored by the ideal game. Consequently,
the Server learns nothing about the Client’s queries, other
than their number.
The Simulator for the Server that we use in our proof
works as follows. When the ideal game tells it to initialize
itself, it generates the secret, sec, and then initializes its view
to record not only the generation of sec, but also its sharing
with the Client (which happens in the real game, but not in
the ideal one). The Simulator’s processing of a database db
proceeds just as in the real game, including the shuffling of
the database, the hashing of database elements (paired with
sec), and the updating of the view.
B. Third Party’s Ideal Game and Simulator
In the TP’s ideal game, the protocol operates normally—
with the Simulator playing the role of the TP—except for a
crucial difference:
there is no shared Server/Client secret, and the
Server and Client do their element hashing in a
private random oracle, one the TP and Adversary
do not have access to.
Because the database is shuffled before being turned into
a hashed database, the TP learns nothing about the order
of the Server’s database, but does learn1 the database’s size.
And it learns how many queries are processed by the Client.
But otherwise it only learns element patterns. If no hash
collisions occur in the private random oracle, it can tell how
many distinct elements occur in the database, and how many
times each one occurs in the database, as well as when
the Client repeats a query, and how many times a query
is in the database—all without knowing anything about the
actual identities of the database elements and queries. But,
because hash collisions in the private random oracle are
possible—and become more probable as the numbers of
unique database elements and distinct queries increase—
there may be false positives. E.g., it may think the database
has an element occurring 5 times, but it may actually have
one element occurring 3 times, and another occurring 2
times.
The Simulator for the TP that we use in our proof behaves
like the TP of the real game, recording in its view its receipt
of the hashed database, hdb, as well as the result of its
processing of each request from the ideal game for it to
count the number of occurrence of a hash tag, tag , in hdb.
C. Client’s Ideal Game and Simulator
In the Client’s ideal game, the database (which does not
need to be shuffled first) is turned into an “elements’ counts”
map detailing the number of times each element of the
database occurs in the database. The Client’s Simulator may
ask the ideal game (passing the current Client view along
with the request) for the next query along with its count.
The ideal game responds to such a request by asking the
Adversary for its next query. If the Adversary refuses (it
will propose no more queries), this refusal is passed on to
the Simulator. Otherwise, the proposed query is looked up
in the elements’ counts map, and the resulting count—or 0,
if the query is not in the map’s domain—is returned, along
with the query, to the Simulator. Consequently, the Client
learns nothing about the database other than the counts of
the queries it proposes.
The Simulator for the Client that we use in our proof
works as follows. When told by the ideal game to initialize
1When talking about what a party can learn in the ideal game, we are
assuming the Simulator faithfully records what it learns in the party’s view.
Otherwise, the party may learn even less.
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itself, it generates the secret, sec, and initializes its view
to record that this secret was received. Its query processing
loop requests a query, elem , and its count, count , from the
ideal game, recording elem’s receipt or the refusal of the
request in its view, and terminating if the request is refused.
Otherwise, it hashes (elem , sec), producing a hash tag, tag ,
and adds (elem , tag , count) to the view.
D. Definitions of Security Against the Protocol Parties
The protocol is said to be secure against a given party
iff the Adversary cannot distinguish the party’s real and
ideal games, i.e., the probabilities of the games returning
true differ by a negligible amount. The idea is that, because
the ideal protocol for a given party is secure by construction,
and the Adversary is incapable of differentiating the games,
the real protocol should also be considered secure. It is
important to note that the Adversary must make its boolean
judgments one protocol at a time—i.e., it is not given the
results of runs of both protocols and allowed to try to tell
them apart.
An Adversary’s strategy for distinguishing a party’s real
and ideal games cannot in general be turned into a way for
the party to learn more than it should be able to; for one
thing, the party is not able to unilaterally choose both the
database and sequence of queries (indeed the TP chooses
neither). But any strategy for such over-learning should
translate into an Adversarial strategy for distinguishing the
real/ideal games, and so the lack of a viable Adversarial
strategy will imply the lack of a way for the party to over-
learn.
Because the Adversary chooses the database and queries,
our definition of security against a given party is at least
as strict as a definition saying that for all databases and
sequences of queries, the results of running the real and
ideal games are indistinguishable. But our Adversaries may
adaptively condition their protocol input choices based on
their interactions with the random oracle, and—in the Server
and Client cases—on the dynamically generated Server/-
Client secret, and so our security definition is strictly more
restrictive than a universally quantified one. This models
the fact that the Server and Client are capable of letting
the shared Server/Client secret influence—intentionally or
not—their choices of database and queries.
V. SECURITY THEOREMS FOR PCR
In this section, we informally state the theorems express-
ing security against the Server, Third Party and Client. To
obtain strong security against the TP and Client, we must
limit the Adversary.
A. Security Against Server
For the Server, we are able to prove perfect security—i.e.,
that the real and ideal games are equally likely to return
true. And we can do this without imposing any restrictions
on the Adversary, not even that its procedures are lossless,
i.e., always terminate.
The only challenging aspect of this proof is dealing with
the hashing done in the Client’s query processing loop of
the real game (but not in the ideal game). The hash tags
resulting from this hashing are only put in the Client’s view,
and so from the Server’s perspective they are redundant. But
at each iteration of the query processing loop, and also at
protocol termination, the Adversary has black box access to
the random oracle. Thus we must prove that the Adversary
cannot tell whether the redundant hashing was actually done.
B. Security Against Third Party
For the Third Party, the Adversary can differentiate the
real and ideal games with high probability2 if it succeeds
in guessing the Server/Client shared secret, sec, of the
real game. More precisely, because it proposes a sequence
elem1, . . . , elemn of queries to the games, it can work
through the bit strings of length sec len, looking for a
secret sec′ such that the hash tags produced by hashing the
(elem i, sec
′) in the random oracle match the corresponding
hash tags appearing in the TP’s view. This will succeed in
the real game, but will be unlikely to succeed in the ideal
game (where the elements were hashed using the private
random oracle on elements).
Consequently, to obtain strong security against the TP,
we must impose some limit on the amount of hashing done
by the Adversary. We have opted to impose a limit, limit,
on the number of distinct inputs the Adversary may hash
before being given a dummy result when new hashing inputs.
Then we are able to upper-bound the absolute value of the
difference in the probabilities of the real and ideal games
returning true by
limit/2sec len,
a fairly tight upper bound on the probability that no more
than limit random choices of bit strings of length sec len
will successfully guess the Server/Client shared secret. The
parameters limit and sec len may be tuned so as to make our
upper bound arbitrarily small.
For a reason that will be made apparent in Section X,
we must also assume the Adversary’s procedures are always
terminating, and we must limit the number of iterations of
the Client’s query processing loop to a constant qrys max,
ensuring termination of that loop. Consequently, the TP
knows there will never be more queries than qrys max.
C. Security Against Client
The Client receives the Server/Client shared secret, sec,
at the beginning of the real game, just before the Adversary
is asked to produce a database. Thus the shared secret is
part of the Client view that is passed to the Adversary when
2We are assuming the TP’s Simulator is the one described in Subsec-
tion IV-B, which is the one we use in our proof.
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the Adversary is asked to produce a database. The Adversary
can distinguish the real and ideal games3 by finding a certain
kind of hash collision, or arranging for the Server or Client
in the real game to cause that kind of hash collision:
• Suppose it can find distinct elements elem and elem ′
such that (elem , sec) and (elem ′, sec) hash to the
same hash tag, tag . Then it can choose [elem ] as the
database, so that [tag] becomes the Server’s hashed
database. And it can choose elem ′ as the only query,
which will have a count of 1 in the real game, but a
count of 0 in the ideal game.
• It can choose a database consisting of a list of distinct
elements whose size is more than 2tag len, the number of
distinct hash tags. This will force the hashed database
produced by the real game’s Server to have one or more
duplicate elements, so that using the elements of the
database as queries, one by one, will result in at least
one query with a count of more than one in the real
game, but a count of exactly one in the ideal game.
• If the Adversary chooses [elem] as the database, it can
choose n distinct elements other than elem as queries.
In the ideal game, all these queries will have counts
of 0, but if n is big enough, the chance of the real
game giving one of the queries a non-zero count will
be non-negligible.
Consequently, we must not only impose a limit on the hash-
ing done by the Adversary, but also limit both the number
of distinct elements in a database chosen by the Adversary,
and the number of distinct queries it may propose. For a
reason that will be explained below, we will actually limit
the number of times the Adversary may propose any query,
making the Adversary avoid proposing duplicate queries if
it does not want to incur the cost.
We impose a hashing “budget,”
budget = adv budget + db uniqs max + qrys max,
on the Adversary, where budget is no more than the number
2tag len of distinct hash tags, and:
• adv budget is the number of distinct elements the
Adversary may hash itself without being considered
“over budget” (except when asked to deliver its final
boolean judgment, when it is not subject to budgeting
as collisions caused at that point are harmless);
• db uniqs max is the maximum number of unique ele-
ments allowed in a database proposed by the Adversary;
and
• qrys max is a limit on the number of times the Adver-
sary may ask to have a query processed.
If the Adversary exceeds its own hashing budget
(adv budget) before proposing its database, or if it proposes
a database with more unique elements than db uniqs max,
3We are assuming the Client’s Simulator is the one described in Subsec-
tion IV-C, which is the one we use in our proof.
then the real and ideal games will skip the Client’s query
processing loop (which would be carried out by the Simula-
tor, in the ideal game). And if, during the query processing
loop, the Adversary (cumulatively) exceeds its own hashing
budget, or if the Adversary asks more than qrys max times
to have a query processed, then the query processing loop
will be terminated early (in the case of the ideal game,
this is done by refusing the Simulator’s request for another
query/count pair).
Then we are able to upper-bound the absolute value of the
difference in the probabilities of the real and ideal games
returning true by
(budget ∗ (budget − 1))/2tag len.
This is two times a fairly tight upper bound on the prob-
ability that no more than budget random choices of hash
tags will result in a duplication. The reason for the factor
of two will be explained in Section VIII. The parameters
adv budget, db uniqs max, qrys max and tag len may be
tuned so as to make our upper bound arbitrarily small.
For a reason that will be made apparent in Section VIII,
we must also assume the Adversary’s procedure’s are always
terminating. We also need that the Client’s query processing
loop always terminates, but this is guaranteed by our use of
qrys max. (If we had only counted unique queries toward
the qrys max part of the hashing budget, termination would
not have been ensured.)
Note that some of hashing done by the Adversary, the
Server (in the real game), and the Client (in the real game)
or Client’s Simulator (in the ideal game) may overlap (i.e.,
an element/secret pair may be queried that is already in
the oracle’s map). Furthermore, in the ideal game, the
db uniqs max part of the hashing budget is unused—in a
sense wasted. But by keeping the different parts of the
budget separate, we ensure the Adversary uses its budget at
the same rate in both games, as well as that the Client’s query
loop runs the same number of times in both games. Because
databases with more than db uniqs max unique elements are
rejected, the Client knows that the database has no more than
db uniqs max elements.
VI. INTRODUCTION TO EASYCRYPT
In EASYCRYPT, cryptographic games (probabilistic pro-
grams) are modeled as modules, which consist of procedures
and global variables. Procedures are written in a simple
imperative language featuring while loops and random as-
signments.
EASYCRYPT has four logics: a probabilistic, relational
Hoare logic, relating pairs of procedures; a probabilistic
Hoare logic allowing one to prove facts about the probability
of a procedure’s execution resulting in a postcondition
holding; an ordinary Hoare logic; and an ambient higher-
order logic for proving general mathematical facts, as well as
for connecting judgments from the other logics. For instance,
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one may use the probabilistic, relational Hoare logic to
prove an equivalence between the boolean-returning main
procedures of two modules whose postcondition says the
procedures’ results are equal, and then use the ambient logic
to prove that the two procedures are equally likely to return
true. One may prove facts involving abstract modules, e.g.,
ones representing adversaries.
Proofs are carried out using tactics, which transform
the current proof goal into zero or more subgoals. Simple
ambient logic goals may be automatically proved using
SMT solvers. Once found, an EASYCRYPT proof script
can be replayed step-by-step, or checked in batch-mode.
Proofs may be structured as sequences of lemmas, and
EASYCRYPT’s theories may be used to group definitions,
modules and lemmas together. Theories may be specialized
using a process called cloning. Abstract theories must be
cloned before they can be used. Requiring (require) a theory
makes it available for use; but it must also be imported
(import) for its definitions and lemmas to be usable without
being qualified by the theory name.
EASYCRYPT has a fairly small trusted computing base
(TCB). Its core proof engine is comprised of about 5,000
lines of OCaml code, implementing well-studied logics
proven correct [24] using the Coq proof assistant [20].
Almost all of EASYCRYPT’s library of mathematical and
cryptographic theories is outside the TCB. When solving
goals using SMT solvers, one may specify the list of
previously proven EASYCRYPT lemmas the solvers may use.
The remainder of this section details the EASYCRYPT def-
initions used in the rest of the paper. EASYCRYPT provides
the types bool, int and real with the expected constants and
operations. If exp denotes a natural number, then exp%r
denotes the corresponding real number. The unit type, unit,
has only one element, (). EASYCRYPT has tuple (product)
types written with * and function types written with → , so
that, e.g., int * bool→ int→ real is the type of functions from
integer/boolean pairs to functions from integers to reals.
EASYCRYPT provides an option type, 'a option, where 'a
is a type variable, which may be instantiated with any type.
This type is defined as a concrete datatype:
type 'a option = [None | Some of 'a].
None and Some are its constructors, and its values are None
and the results of applying Some to the values of type 'a.
The operator oget : 'a option→ 'a transforms an input of the
form Somex to x; when given None, it returns an unknown,
but fixed, value of type 'a. Types in EASYCRYPT are always
nonempty.
EASYCRYPT provides list types, 'a list. E.g., [0; 1; 2] is
the int list consisting of the first three natural numbers. ++
is list concatenation. The operator size : 'a list→ int com-
putes the number of elements in a list. The operator
nth : 'a→ 'a list→ int→ 'a option selects the ith element of a
list (counting from 0); it returns the first (default) argument
when i is out of range. The operator trim : 'a list→ int→ 'a list
deletes the ith element of a list (leaving the list as is if i is
out of range).
EASYCRYPT provides finite set types, 'a fset. There
are the expected operations on finite sets, including
mem : 'a fset→ 'a→ bool: mem xs y tests whether y is an
element of xs.
EASYCRYPT provides finite map types, ('a, 'b) fmap. E.g.,
(int, bool) fmap is the type of finite maps from integers to
booleans. map0 is the empty map. To look up the value of
an element x in a map m whose range has type t, one uses
the notation m.[x], which results in a value of type t option,
giving None when x is not in m’s domain. To update a
map m so that it sends x to y but is otherwise unchanged,
one uses the notation m.[x→ y]. The operators dom and rng
transform a map to its domain and range (finite sets).
EASYCRYPT provides a type 'a distr of probability distri-
butions of type 'a. A distribution is lossless iff the sum of the
weights of all element of its support is 1%r. A distribution is
uniform iff every element of the type has an equal weight in
the distribution. E.g., if n ≤ m, then [n ..m] is the uniform
and lossless distribution on the set of all integers that are at
least n and no more than m.
In EASYCRYPT’s programming language, ordinary vari-
able assignments are written with ← and procedure call
assignments are written with <@:
x← x + 1;
x <@ M.f(x * 2);
There is a shorthand notation for updating maps via assign-
ments:
mp← mp.[x← y];
may be abbreviated to
mp.[x]← y;
If d is a distribution, then
x <$ d;
means to assign to x a value from d, respecting the weights
of elements in d. Choosing a value from a distribution that
is not lossless may fail, terminating the program.
VII. EASYCRYPT FORMALIZATION OF PCR PROTOCOL
In this section, we present the formalization in EASY-
CRYPT of the PCR Protocol. We also give the definitions
supporting this formalization and the statements of security
against the protocol’s parties.
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A. Supporting Definitions
The operator num uniqs : 'a list→ int returns the number
of unique elements in a list. We have a type elem of
elements—a tunable parameter to our games, which may
be instantiated with any type. elem default : elem is some
element. We have a type sec of secrets whose elements
are bit strings of length sec len—a tunable parameter to
our games. The uniform and lossless probability distribution
on secrets is called sec distr. And we have a type tag of
hash tags whose elements are bit strings of length tag len—
a tunable parameter to our games. The tag consisting of
all zeros is called zeros tag. The uniform and lossless
probability distribution on tags is called tag distr.
The type elems counts consists of finite “elements’
counts” maps from elements to integers (thought of as
counts):
type elems counts = (elem, int) fmap.
op empty ec : elems counts = map0.
op get count (cnts : elems counts) (elem : elem) : int =
if mem (dom cnts) elem then oget cnts.[elem] else 0.
op incr count (cnts : elems counts) (elem : elem) : elems counts =
if mem (dom cnts) elem
then cnts.[elem← oget(cnts.[elem]) + 1]
else cnts.[elem← 1].
Thus: empty ec is the empty elements’ counts map;
get count is a function for looking up an element’s count
in an elements’ counts map, getting 0 when the element is
not in the map; and incr count increments an element’s count
in an elements’ counts map, setting its value to 1 when it
was not already in the map.
We have a module with a procedure for randomly shuf-
fling lists:
module Shuffle = {
proc shuffle(xs : elem list) : elem list = {
var ys : elem list; var i : int;
ys← [ ];
while (0 < size xs) {
i <$ [0 .. size xs − 1]; (* pick random index into xs *)
ys← ys ++ [nth elem default xs i];






We provide an abstract theory RandomOracle defining ran-
dom oracles. To use an abstract theory, one must first clone
it, instantiating (some) of its types, operators and predicates
in the process, and yielding a (non-abstract, and so usable)
theory. RandomOracle is parameterized by: a type input;
an operator (constant) output len : int that is constrained to
be a natural number; a type output with exactly 2output len
elements; an operator output default : output; and an operator
output distr : output distr that is the uniform and lossless
distribution on output. RandomOracle defines a module type
(interface) OR:
module type OR = {
proc init() : unit
proc hash(inp : input) : output }.
An implementation of OR provides procedures init and hash,
with the specified types, and the standard implementation is
module Or : OR = {
var mp : (input, output) fmap
proc init() : unit = { mp← map0; }
proc hash(inp : input) : output = {
if (! mem (dom mp) inp) {





Or has a global variable mp, consisting of a finite map from
values of type input to values of type output. The procedure
init initializes mp to the empty map. The procedure hash
first tests whether its input inp is not in mp’s domain. If
the answer is “no,” it simply returns inp’s value in mp.
Otherwise, it updates mp, associating with inp a random
value of type output, and then returns that random value.
RandomOracle also defines two wrappers for random
oracles, each in its own abstract theory. The Limited abstract
theory is parameterized by limit : int, which is constrained
to be a natural number. It implements the limited random
oracle, which is parameterized by an implementation O of
OR, and has the form:
module LOr(O : OR) : OR = { . . . }.
Its hash procedure uses O to do hashing, but keeps track
of the inputs it has previously hashed. When the set of
previously hashed inputs reaches size limit, it continues to
use O to hash elements of the set, but returns output default
on fresh inputs (without changing the set or calling O). Its
init function does not call O.init.
The Counted abstract theory is parameterized by
budget : int, which is constrained to be a natural number.
It provides a new module type of counted random oracles:
module type COR = {
proc init() : unit
proc chash(inp : input) : output
proc hash(inp : input) : output
proc within budget() : bool }.
Here chash stands for “counted” hashing, whereas hash
stands for ordinary hashing. Its implementation has the form:
module COr(O : OR) : COR = { . . . }.
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The procedure hash simply calls O.hash. The procedure
chash keeps track of the elements it has seen while within
budget, only counting inputs not previously seen toward the
budget. It also notes when it goes over budget, i.e., a new
input was presented when the budget was already exhausted.
But unlike LOr’s hash, even when it is over budget, it keeps
using O to do hashing. The within budget procedure tests
whether the oracle is within its budget.
For use in the PCR Protocol definition, and in the Server,
Third Party and Client proofs, we clone RandomOracle, mak-
ing substitutions for the parameters of the abstract theory,
proving that the substitutions have the required properties
(the “realization” part), and calling the resulting theory RO:
clone RandomOracle as RO with
type input← elem * sec, op output len← tag len,
type output← tag, op output default← zeros tag,
op output distr← tag distr
proof *. (* realization *) · · · (* end *)
Now RO.Or is our random oracle. It hashes element/secret
pairs to hash tags, and its limited random oracle wrapper
returns the all zeros tag when a fresh input is hashed but
the hashing limit was already reached.
C. Protocol Definition
We define the types of databases and hashed databases:
type db = elem list. type hdb = tag list.
The protocol views for the three parties have types
type server view = server view elem list.
type tp view = tp view elem list.
type client view = client view elem list.
where the elements of server view elem, tp view elem and
client view elem document events “seen” by the parties—
e.g., that the Server received the database, or that it shuffled
the database.
The PCR Protocol is defined as a module parameterized
by an Environment Env with module type:
module type ENV = {
proc * init and get db() : db option
proc get qry() : elem option
proc put qry count(cnt : int) : unit
proc final() : bool }.
The procedure init and get db initializes the Environment
(that is what the asterisk mandates), and tries to get a
database from it; None means refusal. The procedure get qry
tries to get a query from the Environment; None means
the Environment has refused—by convention, it is done
providing queries. The procedure put qry count tells the
Environment the count corresponding to last query pro-
cessed. And the procedure final finalizes the environment,
and returns the Environment’s boolean judgment.
At the top-level, Protocol looks like
module Protocol (Env : ENV) = {
module Or = RO.Or
var sv : server view var tpv : tp view var cv : client view
var server sec : sec var server hdb : hdb
var tp hdb : hdb var client sec : sec · · ·
proc main() : bool = {
var db opt : db option; var b : bool;
init views(); Or.init(); server gen sec(); client receive sec();
db opt <@ Env.init and get db();
if (db opt 6= None) {








The module has an abbreviation for the random oracle, as
well as global variables for: the three parties’ views; the
secret generated by the Server and the Client’s copy of it;
and the hashed database produced by the Server and the TP’s
copy of it. The main procedure initializes all three views to
be empty lists, initializes the random oracle, asks the Server
to generate the secret (storing it in server sec and updating
its view), asks the Client to receive that secret (storing it
in client sec and updating its view; it gets the secret by
asking the Server for it, which updates the Server’s view),
and then asks the Environment to initialize itself and produce
a database. If the Environment complies, the database is
passed to the Server, which shuffles it (using Shuffle.shuffle),
and turns it into a hashed database, server hdb, all the while
updating its view. Back in main, the TP receives the hashed
database (storing it in tp hdb, and updating its view; it
obtains it by asking the Server for it), and then the Client
query processing loop runs. After that loop terminates, the
Environment is asked for a final boolean judgment, which
main returns as its result. If the Environment refuses to
produce a database, main skips to the finalization step.
The Client’s query processing loop is:
proc client loop() : unit = {
var cnt : int; var tag : tag; var qry opt : elem option;
var not done : bool← true;
while (not done) {
qry opt <@ Env.get qry();
cv← cv ++ [cv got qry qry opt];
if (qry opt = None) { not done← false; }
else {
tag <@ Or.hash((oget qry opt, client sec));
cnt <@ tp count tag(tag);





The code should be self-explanatory, and it is worth com-
paring it with the description of the query processing loop
from Section III. Note how the Environment is asked for a
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query, and informed of the query’s count. Also note how
the Client’s view, cv, is updated. The TP’s tp count tag
procedure is what you would expect: it simply counts the
number of times its argument hash tag appears in its copy
of the hashed database, tp hdb, returning that count, and
updating its view.
VIII. PROOF OF SECURITY AGAINST CLIENT
In this section, we consider the proof of security against
the Client. As explained in Subsection V-C, the Client’s
Adversary is subjected to a hashing budget with three parts:
the hashing it can do directly (adv budget), the hashing it
can make the Server do (db uniqs max), and the hashing it
can make the Client do (qrys max):
op adv budget : int.
axiom adv budget ge0 : 0 ≤ adv budget.
op db uniqs max : int.
axiom db uniqs max ge0 : 0 ≤ db uniqs max.
op qrys max : int.
axiom qrys max ge0 : 0 ≤ qrys max.
op budget : int = adv budget + db uniqs max + qrys max.
axiom budget ub : budget ≤ 2 ˆ tag len.
clone RO.Counted as CRO with op budget← adv budget
proof *. (* realization *) · · · (* end *)
The counted random oracle abstract theory (see Subsec-
tion VII-B) is cloned with adv budget as its budget, with
the resulting theory being called CRO. It uses RO.Or to do
its hashing.
The Adversary’s module type for the Client is defined by:
module type ADV(O : CRO.COR) = {
proc * init and get db(cv : client view) : db option {O.chash}
proc get qry(cv : client view) : elem option {O.chash}
proc qry done(cv : client view) : unit {O.chash}
proc final(cv : client view) : bool {O.hash} }.
This should look similar to the Environment (Env) module
type of Subsection VII-C, but there are important differ-
ences. First, an Adversary is parameterized by a counted ran-
dom oracle, O. The annotations in set braces at the end of the
procedure specifications say that the Adversary’s first three
procedures may only do counted hashing (O.chash), whereas
its final procedure may only do ordinary hashing (O.hash).
Second, put qry count has been replaced by qry done, which
simply tells the Adversary that the processing of the most
recent query has finished. Third, all procedures pass the
Client’s view, and nothing more, to the Adversary.
The Client’s real game, GReal, is listed in Figure 3. First,
three module abbreviations are given: Or is the random
oracle, COr is the counted random oracle derived from Or,
and A is the resulting of connecting the Adversary to COr
(so the Adversary’s calls to the procedures of its parameter
O will be translated into calls to COr’s procedures). It then
declares an Environment, Env, whose procedures call the
corresponding procedures of A, passing them the current
Client view. Finally, GReal’s main procedure simply calls
module GReal(Adv : ADV) : GAME = {
module Or = RO.Or module COr = CRO.COr(Or)
module A = Adv(COr)
module Env : ENV = {
var qrys ctr : int
proc init and get db() : db option = {
var db opt : db option; var adv within budg : bool;
qrys ctr← 0; COr.init();
db opt <@ A.init and get db(Protocol.cv);
if (db opt 6= None) {
adv within budg <@ COr.within budget();
if (db uniqs max < num uniqs(oget db opt) ∨




proc get qry() : elem option = {
var qry opt : elem option; var adv within budg : bool;
qry opt <@ A.get qry(Protocol.cv);
if (qry opt 6= None) {
adv within budg <@ COr.within budget();
if (qrys ctr < qrys max ∧ adv within budg) {
qrys ctr← qrys ctr + 1;
}




proc put qry count(cnt : int) : unit = { A.qry done(Protocol.cv); }
proc final() : bool = {
var b : bool; b <@ A.final(Protocol.cv); return b;
}
}
proc main() : bool = {
var b : bool; b <@ Protocol(Env).main(); return b;
}
}.
Figure 3. Client’s Real Game
Protocol(Env)’s main procedure (so Protocol’s calls to its
argument’s procedures go to those of Env), returning what
it returns.
Env has a global variable qrys ctr that keeps track of the
number of queries that have been processed. The proce-
dure init and get db initializes qrys ctr and COr. (Protocol
initializes Or.) Note how it returns None if the Adversary
proposes a database with too many distinct elements, or
if it exceeds its hashing budget. The procedure get qry
increments qrys ctr each time a query is processed. Note
how it returns None when the query processing limit has
been exceeded or the Adversary has exceeded its budget.
The Client’s ideal game is parameterized by a Simulator
that keeps track of the Client’s view, and communicates with
the ideal game via the following interface:
module type SIG = {
proc get qry count(cv : client view) : (elem * int) option
proc qry done(cv : client view) : unit }.
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SIG stands for “Simulator’s interface to Ideal Game”. The
Simulator calls get qry count to request the next query along
with its count. And it calls qry done to tell the ideal game
it is done processing the most recently received query. The
Simulator itself has the following interface:
module type SIM(O : RO.OR, SIG : SIG) = {
proc * init() : unit { }
proc get view() : client view { }
proc client loop() : unit {O.hash SIG.get qry count SIG.qry done} }.
It is parameterized by both the random oracle O and the
interface SIG to the ideal game. It has procedures for ini-
tialization and obtaining the current view—neither of which
are allowed to access either O or SIG. But its client loop
procedure has access to both O and SIG. We do not need to
limit the Simulator’s access to O—doing more hashing will
not help it learn more about the database.
The Client’s ideal game, GIdeal, is listed in Figure 4. It
is parameterized by both the Adversary Adv and Simulator
Sim. It has a procedure count db for turning the database
into an elements’ counts map, stored in the global variable
db elems cnts. Its submodule SIG implements the Simula-
tor’s interface to the ideal game, and S is an abbreviation
for the connection of Sim to the random oracle and SIG.
The main procedure of GIdeal initializes the queries counter,
Simulator, random oracle and counted random oracle, before
asking the Adversary for a database, passing it the view
provided the the Simulator. As in the real game, if the
Adversary refuses to provide a database, or proposes a
database with too many distinct elements, or exceeds its
budget, the game proceeds on to calling the Adversary’s
final procedure. Otherwise it first uses count db to turn the
database into the elements’ counts map, and then invokes the
Simulator’s Client loop. The get qry count procedure of SIG
is much like the procedure get qry of the submodule Env of
the real game. But instead of returning (Some of) a query,
it returns the query along with its count in the elements’
counts map (0, if it is not in the map’s domain).
The lemma expressing security against the Client is:
lemma GReal GIdeal :
exists (Sim <: SIM{GReal, GIdeal}),
forall (Adv <: ADV{GReal, GIdeal, Sim}) &m,
(forall (O <: CRO.COR{Adv}),
islossless O.chash⇒ islossless Adv(O).init and get db)⇒
(forall (O <: CRO.COR{Adv}),
islossless O.chash⇒ islossless Adv(O).get qry)⇒
(forall (O <: CRO.COR{Adv}),
islossless O.chash⇒ islossless Adv(O).qry done)⇒
(forall (O <: CRO.COR{Adv}),
islossless O.hash⇒ islossless Adv(O).final)⇒
`|Pr[GReal(Adv).main() @ &m : res] −
Pr[GIdeal(Adv, Sim).main() @ &m : res]| ≤
(budget * (budget− 1))%r / (2 ˆ tag len)%r.
It is existentially quantified by a Simulator Sim, and the
restriction on SIM restricts Sim to be a module that cannot
interact with GReal or GIdeal either directly or indirectly
module GIdeal (Adv : ADV, Sim : SIM) : GAME = {
module Or = RO.Or module COr = CRO.COr(Or)
module A = Adv(COr)
var db elems cnts : elems counts var qrys ctr : int
proc count db(db : db) : unit = {
var i : int; var elem : elem;
db elems cnts← empty ec; i← 0;
while (i < size db) {
elem← nth elem default db i;
db elems cnts← incr count db elems cnts elem;
i← i + 1;
}
}
module SIG : SIG = {
proc get qry count(cv : client view) : (elem * int) option = {
var qry opt : elem option;
var qry cnt opt : (elem * int) option;
var adv within budg : bool; var cnt : int;
qry opt <@ A.get qry(cv);
if (qry opt = None) { qry cnt opt← None; }
else {
adv within budg <@ COr.within budget();
if (qrys ctr < qrys max ∧ adv within budg) {
qrys ctr← qrys ctr + 1;
cnt← get count db elems cnts (oget qry opt);
qry cnt opt← Some (oget qry opt, cnt);
}
else { qry cnt opt← None; }
}
return qry cnt opt;
}
proc qry done(cv : client view) : unit = { A.qry done(cv); }
}
module S = Sim(Or, SIG)
proc main() : bool = {
var db opt : db option; var b : bool; var adv within budg : bool;
var cv : client view;
qrys ctr← 0; S.init(); Or.init(); COr.init();
cv <@ S.get view(); db opt <@ A.init and get db(cv);
if (db opt 6= None) {
adv within budg <@ COr.within budget();
if (num uniqs(oget db opt) ≤ db uniqs max ∧
adv within budg) {
count db(oget db opt); S.client loop();
}
}
cv <@ S.get view(); b <@ A.final(cv); return b;
}
}.
Figure 4. Client’s Ideal Game
(except, of course, through its arguments O and SIG). After
the existential quantifier comes the universal quantification
over all Adversaries Adv not interacting with GReal, GIdeal
and Sim, and all initial memories &m. The rest of the lemma
is conditioned on the procedures of Adv being lossless
(always terminating). In the conclusion,
Pr[GReal(Adv).main() @ &m : res]
is the probability of GReal(Adv).main returning true when
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module (Sim : SIM) (O : RO.OR, SIG : SIG) = {
var cv : client view var sec : sec
proc init() : unit = { sec <$ sec distr; cv← [cv got sec sec]; }
proc get view() : client view = { return cv; }
proc client loop() : unit = {
var tag : tag; var qry : elem; var cnt : int;
var qry cnt opt : (elem * int) option;
var not done : bool← true;
while (not done) {
qry cnt opt <@ SIG.get qry count(cv);
if (qry cnt opt = None) {
not done← false; cv← cv ++ [cv got qry None];
}
else {
(qry, cnt)← oget qry cnt opt;
cv← cv ++ [cv got qry (Some qry)];
tag <@ O.hash((qry, sec));






Figure 5. Client’s Simulator
started with memory &m, and
Pr[GIdeal(Adv, Sim).main() @ &m : res]
is the probability of GIdeal(Adv, Sim).main returning true
when started with &m. As expected, the upper-bound on
the distance between these two probabilities is expressed
in terms of budget and tag len.
When proving GReal GIdeal, we implement the Simulator
by the module given in Figure 5. Its initialization procedure
generates the secret, in contrast to in the real game, where
the Server is responsible for doing this.
The Client proof uses a BudgetedRandomOracle abstract
subtheory of RandomOracle providing budgeted random
oracles, which implement the interface
module type BOR = {
proc init() : unit
proc adv bhash(inp : input) : output
proc adv within budget() : bool
proc server bhash(inp : input) : output
proc client bhash(inp : input) : output
proc hash(inp : input) : output }.
providing ordinary hashing, plus budgeted hashing proce-
dures for the adversary, server and client, each subject to
their own parts adv budget, serv budget and clnt budget of
a total hashing budget, budget, that is no more than the
number of elements in output. adv bhash and server bhash
only debit their parts of the budget when called with unseen
inputs, but each call to client bhash counts toward its part
of the budget.
There are two implementations of this interface: a first,
BOr, in which hashing collisions may occur, as usual; and a
second, BOrInj, in which, as long as hash is not called and
all three parts of the hashing budget are (individually) within
budget, the oracle’s map stays injective, i.e., collision-free.
We work with switching adversaries
module type SWADV(O : BOR) = {
proc * main() : bool {O.adv bhash O.adv within budget
O.server bhash O.client bhash O.hash} }.
and have a game GSwitching(SWAdv, O) that takes in a
switching adversary SWAdv and a budgeted random oracle
O, and whose main function initializes O, and then returns
SWAdv’s boolean judgment on O. Our version of the usual
switching lemma bounds the distance between games involv-
ing BOr and BOrInj. It is proved using reasoning up to failure,
which requires the losslessness of the switching adversary.
EASYCRYPT’s failure event lemma is used to upper-bound
the possibility of failure with
(budget ∗ (budget − 1))/2output len+1,
a fairly tight upper bound on the probability that no
more than budget random choices of output values will
result in a duplication. In the Client proof, we clone
BudgetedRandomOracle, substituting adv budget for it-
self, db uniqs max for serv budget, and qrys max for
clnt budget. (When we originally cloned RandomOracle, we
handled the substitutions for input and output, etc.)
In our sequence of games, we transition from the real
game (with the Environment inlined, and simplifications
made), in which the Server and Client use the random
oracle Or but the Adversary uses the counted random or-
acle COr derived from Or, to a game using the collision-
possible budgeted random oracle, BOr. Then we transi-
tion to using the collision-free-while-under-budget budgeted
random oracle, BOrInj, incurring the above upper bound
(with tag len substituted for output len) as a penalty. In
more detail, we define a concrete switching adversary
SWAdv in such a way that the Client’s game involving
BOr can be connected with GSwitching(SWAdv, BOr), and
GSwitching(SWAdv, BOrInj) can be connected with the game
involving BOrInj. The requirement that the switching ad-
versary be lossless explains why the security theorem for
the Client requires the losslessness of the Adversary’s pro-
cedures, and why the number of queries proposed by the
Adversary must be limited. This is how reductions are
carried out in EASYCRYPT.
This sets the stage for the hardest part of the Client proof,
which involves switching from the Server and Third Party
using a hashed database, to them using an elements’ counts
map produced by the Server from the database (whose
elements the Server still hashes), and shared with the TP
(which now accepts requests from the Client for queries to
be looked up in its map). This step uses a complex relational
invariant involving the secret, hashed database (in the first
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game), random oracle’s map, and elements’ counts map (in
the second game). Knowing that the random oracle stays
injective (subject to the budget being respected) made this
step much easier.
After that, we transition back to the collision-possible
budgeted random oracle, BOr, incurring the above penalty
a second time, and then to a game in which the Server and
Client use Or, but the Adversary uses COr.
At this point, the Server’s hashing is seen to be redundant:
the elements of the database are still hashed (paired with
the secret), but nothing is done with the resulting hash tags.
Happily, Grégoire [25] recently invented a general technique
for removing redundant hashing, which we have adapted and
reimplemented. In a RedundantHashing abstract subtheory of
RandomOracle we have module types
module type HASHING = {
proc init() : unit
proc hash(inp : input) : output
proc rhash(inp : input) : unit }.
module type HASHING ADV(H : HASHING) = {
proc * main() : bool {H.hash H.rhash} }.
We have two implementations of HASHING, both built
from a random oracle O: NonOptHashing (“non optimized
hashing”), in which rhash (“r” for redundant) hashes its
input, but discards the result; and OptHashing (“optimized
hashing”), where rhash does nothing. In both cases, hash
works normally. Then we have the following games
module GNonOptHashing(HashAdv : HASHING ADV) = {
module H = NonOptHashing(Or)
module HA = HashAdv(H)
proc main() : bool = {
var b : bool; Or.init(); b <@ HA.main(); return b;
}
}.
module GOptHashing(HashAdv : HASHING ADV) = {
module H = OptHashing(Or)
module HA = HashAdv(H)
proc main() : bool = {
var b : bool; Or.init(); b <@ HA.main(); return b;
}
}.
and a lemma saying one may move from the first game to
the second:
lemma GNonOptHashing GOptHashing
(HashAdv <: HASHING ADV{Or}) &m :
Pr[GNonOptHashing(HashAdv).main() @ &m : res] =
Pr[GOptHashing(HashAdv).main() @ &m : res].
Proving the lemma involves advanced use of EASY-
CRYPT’s eager tactics, but the intuition behind the proof is
simple: redundant hashing can be postponed until the point
where ordinary hashing makes it non-redundant, or when the
end of the game is reached and there is no point in doing it.
Finally, all that separates us from the ideal game (apart
from some inlining and bookkeeping) is that the Server is
still randomly shuffling the database before producing the
elements’ counts map. But we can use the EASYCRYPT Li-
brary’s loop iteration abstract theory to show that computing
the elements’ counts map is independent from the database’s
order.
IX. PROOF OF SECURITY AGAINST SERVER
In this section, we consider the proof of security against
the Server. The Adversary’s module type for the Server is
defined by:
module type ADV(O : RO.OR) = {
proc * init and get db(sv : server view) : db option {O.hash}
proc get qry(sv : server view) : elem option {O.hash}
proc qry done(sv : server view) : unit {O.hash}
proc final(sv : server view) : bool {O.hash} }.
Note that the Adversary is parameterized by an ordinary
random oracle.
The Server’s real game, GReal, is much simpler than that
of the Client, because the Server’s Adversary does not have
to be limited in any way.
The Server’s Simulator has this interface:
module type SIM(O : RO.OR) = {
proc * init() : unit { }
proc get view() : server view { }
proc main(db : db) : unit {O.hash} }.
Its initialization procedure generates the secret and initializes
its view to reflect not just the generation of the secret but
also its sharing with the Client (which happens in the real
game, and so must be simulated in the ideal game). Its main
procedure takes in the database and constructs the Server’s
view, which involves shuffling the database and hashing its
elements (paired with the secret).
The Server’s ideal game, GIdeal, is parameterized by
the Adversary Adv and Simulator Sim. Its main procedure
initializes Sim and the random oracle, before asking the
Adversary to propose its database. If the Adversary obliges,
main runs Sim’s main procedure on that database, and then
executes the version of the Client’s query loop in which
the Adversary’s queries are ignored. In any event, main
finishes by finalizing the Adversary and returning its boolean
judgment.
The lemma expressing security against the Server is:
lemma GReal GIdeal :
exists (Sim <: SIM{GReal, GIdeal}),
forall (Adv <: ADV{GReal, GIdeal, Sim}) &m,
Pr[GReal(Adv).main() @ &m : res] =
Pr[GIdeal(Adv, Sim).main() @ &m : res].
When proving this theorem, the only challenge is dealing
with the fact that, in the Client’s query loop, the real game
does hashing that is absent in the ideal game. That hashing
is redundant: its results are only placed in the Client’s view,
where nothing is done with them. Consequently we can
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use our abstract theory for removing redundant hashing (see
Section VIII) to complete the proof.
X. PROOF OF SECURITY AGAINST THIRD PARTY
In this section, we consider the proof of security against
the Third Party. We start by creating a private random oracle
for hashing elements, not element/secret pairs:
clone RandomOracle as Priv with
type input← elem, op output len← tag len,
type output← tag, op output default← zeros tag,
op output distr← tag distr
proof *. (* realization *) · · · (* end *)
Now Priv.Or is the private random oracle for elements.
The Adversary will have limited access to the random
oracle RO.Or (see Subsection VII-B):
op limit : int.
axiom limit ge0 : 0 ≤ limit.
clone RO.Limited as LRO with op limit← limit
proof *. (* realization *) · · · (* end *)
Thus LRO.LOr is the limited random oracle wrapper. To
ensure termination of the Client’s query loop, the Adversary
will be constrained to proposing at most qrys max queries:
op qrys max : int.
axiom qrys max ge0 : 0 ≤ qrys max.
The Adversary’s module type is
module type ADV(O : RO.OR) = {
proc * init and get db(tpv : tp view) : db option {O.hash}
proc get qry(tpv : tp view) : elem option {O.hash}
proc qry done(tpv : tp view) : unit {O.hash}
proc final(tpv : tp view) : bool {O.hash} }.
The TP’s real game, GReal, is what you would expect.
The Adversary is given access to the limited random oracle.
Its environment submodule, Env, keeps track of the number
of queries that have been processed. The init and get db
procedure of Env initializes the query counter and the limited
random oracle. Its get qry procedure returns None when the
query processing limit has already been reached.
The TP’s Simulator has the following interface:
module type SIM = {
proc * init() : unit
proc get view() : tp view
proc receive hdb(hdb : hdb) : unit
proc count tag(tag : tag) : int }.
It does not need to have access to the random oracle, in
contrast to the Simulators of the Client and Server. The
receive hdb procedure is used to give the Simulator the
hashed database produced by the Server, and the count tag
procedure lets the Client request the counts of hash tags in
that hashed database.
The TP’s ideal game, GIdeal, is parameterized by the
Adversary Adv and Simulator Sim. Adv is given access to
the limited random oracle. The game’s structure is similar
to that of GReal (after inlining and simplification), with Sim
playing the part of the TP, except that the Server and Client
do their element hashing using the private random oracle,
Priv.Or.
The lemma expressing security against the TP is:
lemma GReal GIdeal :
exists (Sim <: SIM{GReal, GIdeal}),
forall (Adv <: ADV{GReal, GIdeal, Sim}) &m,
(* losslessness of Adv's procedures *)⇒
`|Pr[GReal(Adv).main() @ &m : res] −
Pr[GIdeal(Adv, Sim).main() @ &m : res]| ≤
limit%r / (2 ˆ sec len)%r.
The restrictions on SIM and ADV are crucial—otherwise, e.g.,
the Adversary or Simulator could access Priv.Or. The lemma
is conditioned on the Adversary’s procedures being lossless,
and it upper-bounds the distance between the real and ideal
games in terms of limit and sec len.
In the proof, we must transition across a gap: in the real
game, the Server and Client hash elements paired with their
shared secret in RO.Or, whereas in the ideal game, the Server
and Client do their element hashing in Priv.Or. We bridge the
gap by employing an abstract theory SecrecyRandomOracle,
which implements two versions of secrecy random oracles:
module type SEC OR = {
proc init(sec : sec) : unit
proc lhash(inp : elem * sec) : output
proc hash(elem : elem) : output }.
Initializing a secrecy random oracle takes in a secret, sec.
Two hashing procedures are provided: lhash for limited hash-
ing (up to limit distinct inputs) of element/secret pairs, and
hash for unlimited hashing of elements. The first implemen-
tation of this interface uses a single map, as in the TP’s real
game, where hash hashes the pair of its argument elem and
sec, whereas the second implementation uses two maps—
one for lhash and one for hash, as in the TP’s ideal game.
The theory defines games using these oracles, and proves
a lemma bounding the distance between them. The idea is
that unless a secrecy random oracle adversary calls lhash
with a pair whose second component is sec (and without
first exceeding its hashing limit), it cannot tell the games
apart. The lemma is proved using reasoning up to failure,
which requires the losslessness of the secrecy random oracle
adversary. This, in turn, is why the security theorem for the
TP requires the losslessness of the Adversary’s procedures,
and why the number of queries proposed by the Adversary
must be limited.
The lemma’s proof must also bound the probability that
the failure event occurs, i.e., that lhash is passed the secret.
We do this bounding using a SecretGuessing abstract theory.
The secret guessing oracle implements this interface:
module type SG OR = {
proc init(x : sec) : unit
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Figure 6. Two-dimensional Sequences of Games
proc guess(x : sec) : unit }.
The secret guessing game initializes the oracle, giving it a
randomly generated secret. The secret guessing adversary
then has a limited number (limit) of tries to guess the
secret using the oracle’s guess procedure. The proof uses
EASYCRYPT’s probabilistic Hoare logic to upper-bound the
probability of the adversary guessing the secret by
limit/2sec len.
XI. CASE STUDY RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED
In this section, we summarize the results of our case study
and survey what we have learned from carrying it out.
A. On the Proof
The theorems expressing security against the Server, Third
Party and Client, along with all the definitions needed to
understand these theorems (including the definitions of the
PCR Protocol and all the real and ideal games), total about
380 lines of EASYCRYPT code. It is only this code that
must be carefully scrutinized so as to ensure the security
theorems say what they should. EASYCRYPT can be trusted
to faithfully check the approximately 5,275 lines of EASY-
CRYPT code comprising our proofs of these theorems plus
supporting theories.
To minimize our reliance on particular SMT solvers, we
have checked our proofs using two solvers: Alt-Ergo [26]
and Z3 [27]. And in every use of an SMT solver, we
have explicitly specified the previously proved EASYCRYPT
lemmas that may be used by the solver when attacking the
goal. This is good documentation, increases the speed of
proof checking, and is very helpful when proofs need to be
adapted.
The EASYCRYPT proof scripts for our case study are
available on the web at:
https://github.com/alleystoughton/PCR
B. Two-dimensional Game Structure
In the sequence of games approach, to show a relationship
between games G1 and G5 whose main procedures return
booleans, one might make use of intermediate boolean-
returning games G2, G3 and G4, as in Figure 6. Some of
these intermediate steps may show that source and target
games are equally likely to return true, but for others we will
have upper bounds on the absolute values of the differences
between the probabilities that the games return true. One
sums up these (hopefully small!) upper bounds (0 when
there is no distance between the games), getting the distance
between G1 and G5. But in EASYCRYPT, one can also
make use of reductions, giving games a vertical as well as
a horizontal structure. In the figure, we have used another
sequence of games to establish the distance between H1
and H3. Let us suppose H1 and H3 are parameterized by
an abstract adversary A of some type. We can package the
proof connecting H1 and H3 into a theory. Then if we want
to use this theory to establish the connection between G3
and G4, we clone this theory in the context of G3 and G4,
and define a concrete adversary C of the same type as A so
that G3 can be connected with H1(C), and H3(C) can be
connected with G4.
We have made important use of this vertical approach in
our security proof for PCR, using both our own theories and
theories of the EASYCRYPT Library. The reduction of Third
Party security to the security of secrecy random oracles,
which was in turn reduced to the security of secret guessing
oracles, was a prime example of this (see Section X).
C. Expressing Real and Ideal Games
An earlier version of our work suffered from the drawback
that each party’s real game had to be written out from
scratch, even though it was largely the same as the other
parties’ real games. In addition to being tedious, this allowed
for the possibility of the games being inconsistent. Thank-
fully, we now have a solution to this problem: the protocol is
formalized once and for all, complete with code maintaining
all parties’ views (one must carefully scrutinize this code to
ensure it faithfully records sufficient information for each
party’s execution to be reconstructable). The protocol is
parameterized by an Environment, with which it interacts.
The real game for a given party can then be obtained
by instantiating the environment with code connecting the
protocol to the party’s Adversary. Limits on the Adversary
can naturally be expressed in this code. Because the Protocol
Environment is adaptive, this gave us a good start toward
handling adaptive Adversaries.
As explained in Sections VIII—X, we parameterized each
party’s ideal game by both its Adversary and the party’s
Simulator, which constructs the party’s view from the limited
information given it by the ideal game. Because we are
working information-theoretically, we were able to make the
Simulators be part of the security proofs, as opposed to the
security specifications. Consequently, in each of our security
theorems, the Simulator is existentially quantified:
lemma GReal GIdeal :
exists (Sim <: SIM{GReal, GIdeal}),
forall (Adv <: ADV{GReal, GIdeal, Sim}) &m,
. . .
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The restrictions on the module types SIM and ADV express
that the Simulator, Sim, and Adversary, Adv, may not interact
with each other or the real/ideal games (except via their
module parameters). This is crucial, as otherwise we could
prove such a theorem using a Simulator that, e.g., read
variables of the ideal game—which would be unsound.
D. Limiting Adversaries
As explained in Section V, to obtain security theorems
against the Client and Third Party with small upper bounds,
we needed to limit the Adversary. For the Third Party proof
(see Section X), it sufficed to limit the number of distinct
inputs the Adversary may hash before being given a dummy
result when hashing new inputs.
For the Client proof (see Section VIII), we developed
a technique of budgeted random hashing allowing us to
transition in and out of oracles whose maps remain collision-
free as long as the budget is respected. Using this technique
allowed us to attack the key step of the Client proof—
moving from hashed databases to elements’ counts maps—
without the distraction of possible hashing collisions. We
believe this kind of technique will be essential when working
with more complex protocols.
The Client and Third Party security theorems are quan-
tified over all lossless Adversaries (ones whose procedures
always terminate). But when an Adversary runs up against a
limit imposed on it, the real/ideal game is terminated early
(Client proof) or the Adversary’s hashing stops yielding true
results (Third Party proof). Consequently, one may view
these security theorems as being quantified over all lossless
Adversaries that respect the limits that would otherwise be
imposed on them.
By using reasoning up to failure and EASYCRYPT’s
probabilistic Hoare logic and failure event lemma, we were
able to upper-bound the distances between real and ideal
games using bounds built up from game parameters (sizes of
hash tags and Server/Client secrets, limits on the Adversary).
E. Removing Redundant Hashing
Grégoire [25] recently invented a general approach to
removing redundant hashing, and we employed our imple-
mentation of a variation of his technique in both the Client
and Server proofs (see Sections VIII and IX). We believe
variations of this technique will be essential when working
with more complex protocols.
XII. NEXT STEPS
Having developed and tested techniques for proving the
information-theoretic, adaptive security of multi-party cryp-
tographic protocols involving random oracles, our next goal
is to tackle a protocol—probably a protected database search
protocol—involving encryption as well as hashing. Our idea
is to model encryption in a way similar to the random oracle:
as a construction whose encapsulated state depends upon
dynamically made random choices.
A good candidate protocol appears to be the privacy-
preserving sharing of sensitive information protocol of [28],
which uses symmetric encryption as well as four random
oracles. This protocol’s adversary is non-adaptive, and its
security proof doesn’t follow a sequence of games style. But
we are optimistic we can formulate and prove the security
of an adaptive version of the protocol using our approach.
Additionally, we plan to explore the connections between
our work and the Universal Composability (UC) model [29].
Adapting our security proofs of protocols to the UC model
would have the consequence of preserving the protocols’
security guarantees when they are combined with other
protocols. In our architecture, the Adversary/Environment
is already charged with both choosing protocol inputs and
attempting to distinguish the real and ideal games; ergo, we
believe that this extension will be feasible.
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